If external voters are refugees, the agreements can also ensure that the turnout does not become a means of forced or anticipated repatriation of these populations before the conditions for supporting their return are met. Agreements may stipulate that the external voting programme does not prevent or delay the voluntary repatriation of refugees living in the host country. A number of memoranda of understanding between IOM and countries hosting Iraqi refugees contained a language to that effect to ensure that the principle of non-refoulement — the principle of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, according to which no State may expel or repatriate a refugee to an area where his or her life or freedom would be threatened by his or her race. Religion, nationality or political opinion – was respected. On the other hand, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the external vote was largely by post, the Dayton Agreements provided for the repatriation of refugees during the legislature, noting that „the exercise of a refugee`s right to vote must be interpreted as confirmation of his intention to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By election day, the return of refugees should be underway so that many can participate in person. If an electoral process sets the end of a peace agreement (and the end of humanitarian and refugee aid programmes), the obligation for refugees to return to vote in their country of origin may be contrary to the principle of non-refoulement. With an increase in needs and funding, the number of people entering the field has also increased. Today, an estimated 450,000 humanitarian workers worldwide collaborate with 11 UN organizations, more than 780 international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), some 3500 national humanitarian NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement6. In February 1959, transnational oil companies decided to reduce Venezuelan crude oil prices by 5 to 25 cents per barrel and by 18 cents per barrel for Middle Eastern crude oil. In August 1960, oil companies continued to lower Middle Eastern crude oil prices by 10 to 14 cents per barrel. (2) At the time, these reductions were significant in percentage terms. The two successive reductions were decided without prior consultation with the governments concerned. The only reason for these price drops was the situation of the market, a market largely monopolized by these companies.
These measures were clearly in the interests of companies and their countries of origin and did not concern themselves with the national interests of oil-exporting developing countries. First, all parties must guarantee the secrecy, neutrality and transparency of the external electoral programme, without local political or state interference or interference. . . .